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THE EFFECTS OF TAX-LAW CHANGES
ON PRICES IN THE PROPERTY-CASUALTY
INSURANCE INDUSTRY
ABSTRACT
During the 1980s, the federal income tax treatment of property-casualty insurers and their
policyholders underwent several important changes, the most significant of which came in 1986.
This paper develops theoretical predictions for how these changes should have affected the
equilibrium prices of property-casualty insurance policies, and explores the extent to which the
theoretical predictions are reflected in data on industry experience. The paper is devoted mainly to
a careful specification of the income tax rules, and to deriving the connection between predictions
about simple forms of insurance policy and industry data on “premiums earned.” Although the
predicted impact of the changes in the tax rules enacted in 1986 translates into a tax on premiums
(net of the cost of acquisition) of up to 13 percent (on medical malpractice, the longest-tail line of
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Introduction
Artinsurance company is a financial intermediary whose main line of business is the sale of
a particular type of contingent contract, called an insurance policy. Under this contract, the
insurer promises to pay some amount to the policyholder, or to some other beneficiary, following
the occurrence of an insured event. In the context of property-casualty insurance, the relevant
insured events include, for example, the accidental destruction of the insured’s property or the
award of a liability judgment against the insured. In return for this promise the insured pays the
insurer a premium. The premium and the earnings on the premium are then used by the insurer to
.
Princeton University and the National Bur~u of Economic Research, and the Universityof Michigan Law
Sch~l, rexvely. This paper is a part of the projeeton theEconomicsof the Propertyand Casualtyinsurance
Industry within the National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge,MA,withthe support of the Insurance
Information Institute. Dting its preparation, Bradford enjoyd the hospitality of the Economic Policy Research
Unit at the Copenhagen Business School. He would also like to express appreciation for the supprt of the John M.
Olin Foundation and Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School and Center for Economic Policy Studies.
Logue thanks his colleagues at the University of Michigan Law Schml for many helpful discussions regarding the
issues discussed in the paper, He also received generous research support from the Cook Research Fund at the
University of Michigan Law School. Both authors thank Sean Mooney of the Insurance Inforrnatron Institute for
helpful comments and suggestions. Stuart Thiel, of the University of Michigan, and Ryan Edwards, of Princeton
University, provided extraordin~ research assistance. The usual caveats apply.2
cover its administrative costs, to pay the eventual loss claims that arise under the policy, and to
provide a profit to the owners of the insurance company.
During the 1980s, the federal income taxtreatment of property-casualty insurers and their
policyholders underwent several important changes, the most significant of which came in 1986
A priori reasoning suggests that the income taxtreatment of insurance companies should affect
equilibrium prices of insurance. In this article we develop theoretical predictions for how these
changes should have affected the equilibrium prices of property-casualty insurance policies, and
we explore the extent to which the theoretical predictions are reflected in the available data on
industry underwriting experience.
One initial challenge presented by our study is conceptual: In the case of property-
casualty insurance, it is not clear what one means by “price” or “quantity.” The annual premium
received by an insurance company in exchange for the sale of a single one-year occurrence-based
policy (that is, a policy that covers losses arising out of insured events that occur during the one-
year period in which the policy is in force) can be understood as the product of a unit price for
that type of coverage and the quantity of insurance embodied in the policy. But neither the price
nor the quantity is directly observed. We take as a measure of the quantity of insurance contained
in such a policy the total value of all the loss indemnity payments and loss expenses (such as
attorneys’ fees) that the insurer expects to pay in comection with that policy. The price of the
policy, them is the ratio of the premium to this measure of quantity. Our analysis thus addresses
the role of taxes in the determination of this ratio.
For purposes of relating the predictions of theory to industry experience, we suffer from a
lack of information about what insurance companies actually expect to pay, What we have3
instead are the companies’ reported premiums earned and their reported estimates of what they
expect to pay in the fiture as
These estimates are provided
“annual statements. ” Annual
a result of policies they have written as of the date of the report,
amually both to state regulators and to the public on forms called
statement (or “statutory”) accounting data are also used by insurers
in calculating their federal income tax liability, which, of course, is reported to the Internal
Revenue Senice. Our discussion of insurance accounting, of which there will necessarily be a fair
amount, draws primarily horn Mooney and Cohen (199 1) and Troxel and Bouchie (1990).
We divide the paper into four parts, In Part I we set forth a precise, albeit stylized,
description of a property-casualty insurance policy and a detailed taxonomy of insurance prices
and quantities. Understanding this taxonomy will require a measure of patience and perseverance
of the reader, but, in our view, it is worth the effort; and that taxonomy, in any event, will be used
throughout the remainder of the paper as well as in the appendices. In Part 11we use this
taxonomy to describe two methods of accounting for the financial results of a property-casualty
insurer: statutory or annual statement accounting and nominal-economic-income accounting, In
Part 111we summarize the federal income tax treatment of property-casualty insurance companies,
with an emphasis on certain important changes that were made as part of the Tax Reform Act of
1986 (“TR486”), (The most important changes made by the TR486 for our pu~oses were the
introduction of the loss-reserve discounting requirement and the inclusion of 20 percent of
unearned premiums.) In Part III we also discuss briefly the tax treatment of liabilities that are not
funded through property-casualty insurance, and we describe a significant change in those rules
that was enacted in 1984. In Part IV, we develop the theory of how income taxes affect the
break-even prices of insurance (with special attention to the changes made by the TM86). In4
Part V, we present calculations of break-even prices based on the theory from Part IV, and we
compare those calculations with the historical record of the industry. The data consist of the
losses incurred and loss-adjustment-expenses incurred (i.e., estimated loss payouts on existing
policies) and the premiums earned by U.S. property-casualty insurers during the period from 1976
to 1993. The source of the data is the aggregated annual statement information published in
Best’s Aggregates & Averages: Proper~-Cawalty Edition. Various details of our procedures are
described in appendices.
Our predictions regarding the effect of the TRA86 changes can be summarized as follows:
(1) For all tax years aher 1986 we would expect to see some increase in the break-even price of
insurance, and we would expect the size of the increases to be positively correlated with the level
of market interest rates and with the length of the “tail” of the given line of insurance, When we
take a look at the data, however, although the predicted impact of the changes in the tax rules
enacted in 1986 translates into a tax on premiums (net of the cost of acquisition) of up to 13
percent (on medical malpractice, the longest-tail line of insurance), the predicted change still is
small relative to the variability of the actual loss experience, As a result, it is not possible to draw
statistically valid conclusions from the historical time series about the effect of tax reform on
prices, (2) For the 1986 tax year, owing to a special transition rule in the TRA86 called the “fresh
start,” we would expect a one time reduction in premiums, as the fresh-start essentially provided
property-casualty insurers in 1986 with an extra incentive to issue policies during that year. This
effect too, however, does not appear in the data.5
Part I. Describing an Insurance Policy
We begin our detailed description of a theoretical insurance policy by introducing the
concept of a spot policy: an insurance contract that covers the policyholder for the stream of
fiture loss payments that will arise out of a single specified loss event that has already occurred.
A standard policy is our term for a group of spot policies sold by an insurance company to a
single insured as a package for a given policy period, typically one year. Thus, under a standard
policy, in exchange for a premium payment horn the insured, the insurer agrees to issue individual
spot policies for any insured loss event that occurs during the policy period.’ We treat the
premium for a standard policy as being paid to the insurer on the date that the policy is written.
This premium can be understood as a foward purchase of a package of spot policies. With a real
insurance contract, the stream of loss payments associated with a covered event will not be
known with certainty, Since the tax law changes we consider have related solely to the treatment
of the timing of cash flows and not to the treatment of risk, we focus on the special case in which
the loss profile is known with certainty to the insurance company.’
We describe the losses covered by a spot policy or standard policy in terms of the policy’s
cumulative loss payments, L(.), where L(I) specifies the cumulative cash outflow of loss
‘The standard policy is the formalization, of a typical insurance policy, such as a one-year occurrence-based
commercial general liability policy, Such a plicy, when issued, in effect obligates the insurer to issue what we call
spt policies during theyearto “fund” losses as they occur. Insurers rarely issue individual spot policies outside of
the context of a standard pliq, although something approximating such policies do exist. For example,
retroactive insuance policies, which are issued after a loss event has occurred as a means of funding the liability
through a property <asualty insurer, are relatively rare but not unprecedented. Such a policy approximates the
economics of a spot policy, although a retroactive policy can still entail a fair amount of uncertainty regarding the
total amount and the timing of loss payments. For the sake of simplicity, our amlysis assumes away such
uncertainty.
2For discussions of the pricing of the risk associated with loss and unearned premium resemes, see Butsic (1991),
D’Arty (1988) and Kraus and Ross (1982),6
payments made by time Z,measured from the date of writing the policy. (Except where we
speci~ otherwise, the term 10SSpayment should be understood as gross of the insurance
company’s allocated loss adjustment expenses. ) We use the term loss profile to refer to the
finction that describes the increases in L over time, that is, the finction that describes the actual
cash outflows. We denote the path of such payments, 1(~, as a finction of time elapsed since the
moment of writing. This may be a continuous finction that expresses the rate of payment per unit
time (so that the payment during the short time, dl, after t is given by the product, l(~dt) or, more
typically for our application, may consist of a sequence of payments at specified time points. (The
loss profile bears the same relationship to the cumulative loss payments as does a density or
probability finction to a cumulative distribution finction.)
Insurance Ouantity Defined: S~ot Policies
L(m) is the sum of all the loss payments on the policy, which, if the meaning is clear from
the context, we denote as simply, L, Then the normalized loss profile, /(t)/L, sums to 1. If two
different policies, characterized by loss profiles l*(fl and ?(O, have the same normalized loss
profiles, we say they are in the same line of insurance policies. This terminology is intended to
capture the idea that a line of insurance (such as medical malpractice) consists of policies with
similar anticipated time profiles of payouts (with the same length’of tail, for example). We refer
to the loss profile in a line that sums to 1 as the unit profile for that line; and a policy that has the
unit profile is a unit policy in a line. The loss profile of any policy in a line is then a multiple, L,
of the unit profile, and so it is meaningful to speak of L as the quantity of insurance embodied in a
policy in a line.7
Any given spot policy can be understood as a quantity of unit policies in the relevant line.
A unit policy in a line, such as automobile liability, pays a total of $1 over time, with the time
pattern characteristic of the line. For example, the industry average unit loss profile for an auto
liability spot policy in the period we are studying is shown in Table 1. (But for rounding, the total
in the table would be 1,00,)
























Source: Authors’ calculations based on
Best’s AwreRates and Averages, various years
Insurance Prices Defined: SDot Policies
Let P stand for the premium received by the company (net of selling costs) at the moment
of writing a spot policy with a particular loss profile, /(), The single premium buys a whole
profile of loss payments. (When we want to emphasize that the premium pays for losses that have
already been incurred as of the date of writing, we refer to it as a spot premium, in contrast with
the premium paid on a standard insurance policy.) Just as it is meaningful to speak of the quantity8
of insurance in a spot policy within a given line, so we can speak of the price of insurance implicit
in the policy: It is simply the ratio of the premium to the total anticipated losses:
In our terminology, the premium on a given policy is not the price, It is like the amount paid for a
quantity of potatoes, the product of a per-unit price and a number of units purchased, The price
of a policy in a line of insurance is the premium on a unit policy.
A unit single-payment policy in a line pays off exactly 1 at the payoff time characteristic
of the line, which, by analogy with bond terminology, we refer to as the policy’s maturity. In
fact, we shall make a great deal of use of the analogy, noted by others, of the sale of a policy by
an insurance company with a loan from policyholder to company, the premium being loaned
against repayment in the form of policy payoffs (see, for example, Cummins and Grace, 1994).
The unit single-payment policy that pays off at T corresponds to a discount one dollar bond
maturing at T, Each unit policy, in turn, can be understood as composed of a sum of quantities of
single-payment unit policies.
Standard Policies: Prices and C)uantities
Just as a spot policy can be understood as a package of single-payment policies, as
discussed above, a standard policy can be understood as a package of spot policies. Thus, for
example, under an auto liability policy written on September 1, 1987, a company might have
expected to accumulate $40 in incurred losses for each passing day, or $40x365 = $1,460 in
incumed losses during the policy year. We can think of the premium as a foward purchase of the
package of spot policies. The parties to a standard policy are generally uncertain about the size of
the spot policies that will come into being as a result of events during the policy year (for9
example, a fire that damages a factory), and, for each of those spot policies, they will generally be
uncertain about the amount and time profile of the loss payments and expenses (it takes time to
determine the amount of the covered damages, which maybe paid out over a course of years). Of
course, the company has a good idea of what those losses are going to be, and we might express
this idea in probabilistic terms, As was the case for the description of a spot policy, however, it
eases exposition and analysis to assume it known that each day (or moment) during the policy
year will add one identical spot policy to the company’s liabilities,
policies involves a known and certain profile of loss payments.
And each of those spot
Thus a standard policy can be built up from unit spot policies, which can in turn be built
up from unit single-payment spot policies, By direct analogy with a spot policy, we define as a
unit standard policy in a line one on which the losses over the policy year aggregate to 1,
Part 11. Accounting for Insurance Policies
To understand the taxation of an insurance company and to interpret the available data, we
need to express the ideas just discussed in terms of the financial, regulatory, and tax accounting
for the company. Our eventual goal is to be able to account for a standard policy, but we will
begin with the accounting of a
Accounting for a St)ot Po]icv
spot policy and build from there.
Thus we start with the simplified example of an insurance company that issues a spot
policy characterized by loss profile, 10. At that moment, the insurer will add to its balance sheet
a new asset, the premium receivable, P, and a new liability, the obligation to pay out /() over
time. In terms of statuto~ accounting, the balance-sheet ent~ corresponding to this new liability
is the unpaid losses account, sometimes referred to as the insurer’s loss reseme. If the sole10
purpose of the insurer’s reported loss reseme were to reflect the market value of the new liability,
w
the reserve would presumably be carried as the discounted value of the loss payouts, ~l(t)e-tidt,
o
where r is the going interest rate (for simplicity, assumed constant in this formula). As we discuss
below, that amount also represents the break-even spot premium for this policy in a system
without taxes. Therefore, when an insurer writes a break-even spot policy under these
assumptions, it would have no net effect on the insurer’s balance sheet, as the values of the new
liability and the new asset would be directly offsetting. More generally, the discounted loss
reserve associated with a policy represents the discounted value of the payments remaining to be
made as of any particular time in the life of the policy,
Note, however, that the rules of statutory accounting applied by state regulators require
the use of undiscounted loss reserves for regulatory reporting purposes. Thus, when reporting
the loss resewe for a given spot policy as of time t‘(relative to the date of the loss) on its
regulatory balance sheet, the insurer must use the simple sum of all anticipated fiture loss
payments associated with that policy, ~ I(i)di, The value of this undiscounted loss resene will
t’
exceed the value of the discounted loss reserve, and the amount of the difference will depend
upon the applicable interest rate and the length of the tail of the spot policy in question. As we
show in considerable detail below, at interest rates that are high but within historical precedent
and for a long-tailed policy (such as medical malpractice), the difference can be substant ial.3
‘ If we let R(f) stand for the amount remaining to be paid on a policy, then writing the policy increases the
company’s net worth according to regulatory accounting rides by P-R@). Time-value of money considerations lead
us to expect R@) to be greater than P, so the effect of writing a plicy is expected to reduce net worth under
statutory accounting. In orderto meetstatutorysolvencyrequirements,thecompanymusthavesomecapitalof its11
An insurance company’s loss resewe is a stock concept; it is a liability, the value of which
can be measured at any given time. The income calculation of a company, corresponding to this
balance sheet accounting, is obtained by taking year to year differences. Thus, the premiums
taken in during the year will be added in, and the increase in outstanding loss reserves will be
deducted. This the conceptual basis for the loss reserve deduction in the calculation of taxable
income.
An insurance company’s total annual income is the sum of its underwriting income and
investment income. Investment income is simply the amount earned by the insurer on invested
premiums and reinvested earnings, net of investment expenses. Underwriting income is calculated
by taking the difference between premiums earned and underwriting expenses incurred during the
year, And typically one of the largest underwriting expense deductions, the loss reserve
deduction, is the increase in outstanding loss resetves during the year.
Accounting for a Standard Insurance Policy
When we move from the accounting for a spot policy to the accounting for a standard
policy, things get more complicated, The sale of a standard policy is, in essence, the advanced
sale of a series of spot policies to be issued as time passes. Thus, at the precise moment the
standard policy is issued to the insured, assuming the premium is paid at the moment of issuance,
the insurance company for a brief time has an asset (in the form of the premium) with no
offsetting loss reserve liabilities. Those liabilities are incurred only as time passes and as the
own to balance Mlciently the negative effect of writing a plicy. Thus, the conservative accounting conventions
imposed by regulation, coupled with accounting net worth restrictions, have the effect of obliging companies to
hold collateral against their more distant obligations to pay out under the policy. In this simple model,
contributing own capital to a company need not be particularly costly, since it may be held by the company in a
form that earns a competitive rate of return.12
implicit (or hypothetical) spot policies are issued over the course of the policy period (which,
again, is typically one year), Therefore, at the moment the standard police is issued, the offsetting
liability is the obligation to provide the implicit spot policies over time. Statutory accounting
deals with this obligation through a balance-sheet entry called the unearned premium resene.
By convention, the premium on a standard insurance policy is treated as earned, and the
unearned premium reserve is correspondingly reduced, pro ra[a during the policy year. During
that time, spot-policy loss liabilities are incurred, giving rise to loss payments and loss reserves for
unpaid losses. In arriving at its amual underwriting income, an insurer deducts from premiums
earned (in addition to the amual increase in loss reserves) the year-to-year increase in the
company’s unearned premium reserve.
From SDot Prices to Earned Premiums and Incurred Losses by Accident Year
Statutory accounts present reports on an insurance company’s earned premiums and
incurred losses, categorized by accident year, The term accident year refers to the calendar year
during which losses were incurred under policies issued by the company, The premiums earned
during an accident year consist of the allocated fractions of the premiums on standard policies that
cover any part of the calendar year in question. Because of the convention of assuming that a
premium is earned at an even rate over the policy year, the premiums earned during an accident
year are not exactly the same as the sum of implicit spot premiums charged for the coverage.
(The way we deal with this in our calculated prices is detailed in Appendix B,)
Accounting and Economic Income Concer)ts
As mentioned above, under the insurance accounting rules that govern the calculation of
annual income for regulatory purposes, property-casualty insurers take loss-reseme deductions on13
an undiscounted basis. Accordingly, statutory accounting has the effect of accelerating
deductions when compared with nominal economic accounting, As we define the term, the
nominal economic income of a company is the sum of all cash payments to the company’s
owners and the increase in the market value of the company’s assets net of liabilities during the
year. For a company that makes no distributions to its owners, the nominal economic income is
simply the year-to-year change in its net worth when all assets and liabilities are accounted for at
their current market value, Nominal economic income may be contrasted with economic income,
as the term is often used in discussions of tax policy. As applied to a firm, economic income
means the sum of distributions to owners and the annual change in the firm’s net wotih, corrected
jor inflation--that is, with all the elements measured in constant-purchasing power units, For our
purposes, nominal economic income is the relevant concept, since all ordinary borrowing and
lending transactions are accounted for in the tax law according to nominal economic income
rules.’
The effect of the inconsistency between nominal economic income accounting and
statutoty accounting can be seen in the following simple example, Imagine an insurance company
that issues one identical insurance policy every year, that invests all cash inflows at the going
constant rate of interest, and that, contrary to the regulatory requirements, has no capital of its
own other than accumulation born premiums and earnings on premiums (that is, the insurer
maintains no surplus), If we then look at the balance sheet of this company at the end of any
given year, we will see a stock of assets consisting of the accumulations from past and current
4 Whenother transactions are accounted for on other bases, tax arbitrage will give rise tobiases in the portfolios of
m~payers in different situations and to differences in the market yields on various financial products according to
the tax circumstances of the holder (Bradford, 1981).14
premium receipts, plus interest earned on those invested premiums, net of loss (and loss expense)
outlays, In a competitive market, the assets on hand will just equal the discounted value of the
unpaid losses on the stock of policies. Thus, the market value of this package of assets and
liabilities will be zero every year. What’s more, the company’s nominal economic income (the
annual change in the market value of its assets and liabilities; the company is paying out nothing to
its owners) will also be zero.
In contrast, the net worth of the company understood in statutory-accounting terms will
be negative Indeed, under the assumptions of the example, it will be the same negative amount
each year (since the company issues identical policies each year). Moreover, afier the start-up
years, the statutory annual income of the insurer will also be zero. (During the start-up years, the
statutory income would be negative, ) If the insurer were then to stop writing these hypothetical
yearly policies, statutory accounting and nominal economic accounting would diverge. Under
nominal economic accounting, the value of the insurer’s portfolio of assets and liabilities would
remain at zero, and the insurer’s nominal economic income would continue to be zero from year
to year as the old policies were paid off, Under statutory accounting, however, the insurer’s
income would be positive, since it would have earnings on its assets and any loss payment would
be associated with an offsetting reduction in the stock of unpaid losses, with a corresponding
addition to statutory income at that point, Conversely, if the company started expanding its
business, its nominal economic income would remain zero, but its statutory income would be
negative,
The inconsistencies between nominal economic accounting and statutory accounting are
especially significant because, before the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (“TW86”), the federal income15
tax treatment of property-casualty insurance companies essentially replicated statutory
accounting, Part III summarizes the federal income tax treatment of property-casualty insurance
companies, and it emphasizes how that treatment was changed by the TW86. Part III also
discusses briefly a change that took place in 1984 in the tax treatment of liabilities not finded
through property-casualty insurance policies.
Part LII. The Federal Income Tax Treatment of Property-Casualty Insurance
The Tax Treatment of ProDerty-Casualtv Insurance Companies
The federal income tax treatment of property-casualty insurance companies is governed by
a special set of rules that are collected in subchapter L of the Internal Revenue Code. Under
subchapter L, insurers are generally required to calculate their taxable income using the same
statuto~ accounting conventions required by state regulators, which we described above in Part
11, As mentioned in that Part, statutory accounting requires an insurer to calculate its annual
income by taking into account both its net underwriting profit (or loss) and its net investment
income (or loss) for a given reporting year, that is, the year for which the annual statement
report is filed--which coincides with the insurer’s tax year. Consistent with statuto~ accounting,
an insurer’s year-end underwriting income is determined roughly as follows:
1) Start tith premiums written during the reporting year (in our model, these
are the premiums received upon issuance of a standard policy) less
2) premium acquisition expenses incurred during the reporting year (these are





the increase in the insurer’s unearned premium
year less
account during the reporting
the increase in the insurer’s unpaid losses account during the reporting year
(this is the Ioss-reseme deduction mentioned in Part II, i.e., the net increase
during that reporting year in the insurer’s estimate of its fiture claim payments)
less
any actual paid losses that occurred during the reporting year that did not
correspond to a reduction in the unpaid losses accounts
of this calculation--the insurer’s net underwriting income--is then added to net
investment income (which is simply the difference between investment earnings and investment
expenses) to get taxable income.
Until the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, subchapter L permitted propefiy -
casualty companies to calculate their loss-reserve deductions on an undiscounted basis, just as
they have always been required to do for regulatory purposes. That is, for tax purposes an insurer
simply deducted the difference between the beginning balance and ending balance in its unpaid
losses account, without taking into account the fact that those liabilities represented payments to
be made in the fiture. This rule had the effect of giving property-casualty insurers the benefit of
the inconsistency between statutory accounting and nominal economic income accounting
described above.
‘ The sum of 4 and 5 for a given reporting year is referred to in statutory accounting as the losses incurred.17
In the early and mid 1980s, in various repotis to Congress it was argued that, as a result of
this inconsistency between statutory accounting and nominal-economic-income accounting, (a)
the property-casualty industty had for years been paying less in federal income taxes than it should
have been and (b) a bias in favor of finding risks through property-casualty companies had been
created.’ At least in part on the basis of such arguments, Congress included in the TW86 a
requirement that, for all tax years after 1986, all loss-reseme deductions must be calculated in a
discounted basis, For any post-86 tax year, the loss-reserve deduction is determined by taking the
difference between the discounted value of the beginning balance in the unpaid losses account and
the discounted value of the ending balance in that account,
Thus the post-86 treatment of loss reserves approximates the treatment required by
nominal-economic-income accounting. Differences remain, however. For example, the TRA86
and the Treasury regulations that have been promulgated under it contain fairly specific rules
limiting how the discounting requirement may be implemented. The insurer must use discount
factors that are published periodically by the Treasury department, (Those discount factors may
diverge from the actually prevailing rates.) Artd the insurer must, with some exceptions, use the
“loss payment patterns” (or, to use our terminology, the loss profiles) that are also published
every few years by Treasury. Those loss profiles--there is a separate prodle for each line of
insurance--are calculated by Treasury using data from previously filed amual statements for the
entire industry. Under some circumstances an insurer can elect to use its own historical loss
‘ This argument was made, for example, in a very influential repofi to Congress issued by the General Accounting
~lce, (GAO 1985). The rewrvediscounting requirement ultimately enacted by Congress (discussed below in the
text) essentially adopted the GAO proposal.18
experience in calculating the profile for purposes of discounting; however, many insurers camot
quali~ for that option,’
In addition, a special transition rule--called theflesh start--was inserted in the TRA86.
This rule essentially permitted insurers a second deduction (spread out over a number of years)
equal to the difference between the discounted value and the undiscounted value of the total year-
end 1986 loss reserves. In the absence of the fresh-start rule, the introduction of the reseme-
discounting requirement would have produced a large lump-sum tax on property-casualty insurers
for the 1986 tax year. When total year-end reserves were required to be discounted to present
value, instead of a fresh start there would have been a large loss-reserve inclusion in gross income
equal to the amount of the discount.’ However, Congress chose to permit insurers to exclude that
amount from gross income.
In addition to the loss-resewe discounting requirement, TM86 also made a number of
other changes in the tax treatment of property-casualty insurers. Prominent among these for our
purposes was the change in the treatment of the unearned premium reserve.’ Before TRA86,
‘ In applyingtheTreasury’sdiscount factors to its statutory loss reserves, the insurer is allowed to take into
account the extent to which the reserve were already discounted on the annual stalement. As we have already
noted, however, most state regulatog authorities do not permit discounting of reserves for annual-statement
pupses.
‘ This inclusion would have been required by Internal Revenue Cede section481 (a). When there is a change in
accounting methods that would otherwise permit doubledeductions, section 48l(a) provides a method by which the
effect of the second deduction can k eliminated or at least reduced, Therefore, absent the fresh-start rule in the
86-Act, section 481(a) would have required all proprty+asualty insurers either to include the amount of the
discount in income in 1986 or, at least, to include the amount of the discount over a period of years. The fresh-
start rule essentially trumped the effect of section 48l(a).
9 One change that we will not deal within this paper involved insurers’ tax-exempt income. The ~86 required
property-casualty insurers to include 15percent of what was previously interest income from state and local
government bonds and from untaxecl dividends. Other major m changes in 1986 that fiected propew-casualty
insurers were the reduction in co~rate rates (from 46% in 1986 to 40% in 1987 and to 34°Ain 1988) and the
introduction of the alternative minimum tax.19
subchapter L permitted insurers to deduct the fiJllvalue of the amual increase in their unearned
premium reserve, thereby excluding from income revenue that had not yet been accrued. In both
committee reports accompanying T~86, it was contended that this ability to exclude unearned
premiums, coupled with the allowance of an up-front deduction for premium acquisition expenses,
resulted in a mismatching of income and expenses.’” Therefore, in an effort to produce a rough
matching of income and expense, a provision was included in TRA86 in effect reducing the annual
uneamed-prernium-reseme deduction by 20 percent.
We would expect, a priori, that both of these changes in the tax treatment of property-
casualty insurers--the loss-reserve discounting requirement and unearned premium inclusion--to
have effects on break-even prices in the property-casualty market. In Part IV below, where we
discuss the effect of taxes on break-even prices generally, we also set forth specifically y our
predictions regarding the effects of these changes. (In general, we could expect a decrease in
prices in 1986--due to the fresh start--and an eventual increase in break-even prices in the years
thereafter owing to the switch to discounted reserves. ) Then in Part V we explore the extent to
which the actual industry-wide aggregate data--taken from Bes[ ‘.sAg=egules and Averages--
matches our predictions.
Before turning to Part IV, however, we briefly summarize another interesting change in
the tax laws that occurred in 1980s--specifically in 1984--which we would expect to have some
(albeit small) effect on equilibrium property-casualty prices, although we do not attempt to model
this effect in Part IV.
‘0Joint Committee (1986),20
The Tax Treatment Of Liabilities Not Funded Throuqh Propertv-Casualty Insurance Comuanies
Thus far we have been discussing the economics and accounting of how a business or an
individual might find certain types of liabilities through a property-casualty insurance policy. And
in the previous section we explained how the pre-TRA86 tax rules for property-casualty
companies created a bias in the direction of finding risks in that manner (at least as compared to
the incentives that would have existed under a nominal economic income tax). In this section we
explain how a fundamental change in the tax treatment of liabilities accrued by noninsurance
companies--that is, liabilities /lot finded through a propefiy-casualty company--that was enacted
in 1984 should have itzcreased, if only temporarily, that bias in favor of property-casualty risk
finding,
Before the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1984, businesses that used the accrual
method of accounting for federal tax purposes could, in a veiy rough way, approximate the
accelerated deductions available to property-casualty insurance companies. This acceleration of
deductions resulted horn the application of the traditional “all events test, ” which determines
generally the timing of deductions taken by accrual method taxpayers. Under the pre-TRA84
version of this test, an accrual method taxpayer could deduct a liability in the year in which (a) all
events necessary to fix the liability had occurred and (b) the amount of the liability could be
determined with reasonable accuracy, Thus, for example, whenever the taxpayer entered into a
binding contract to make a fixed payment in the fiture, the taxpayer could--in the year of
contracting--deduct the undiscounted face value of the fiture payment, even if the payment was
not to be made for several years.21
To illustrate the effect of this rule, consider the following example of a structured-
settlement arrangement that might have occurred before the TRA84: An individual is injured on
January 1 in Year 1 by a product manufactured by Company X. Assume that the company and
the individual agree to settle the claim for $823 to be paid by the company to the individual on
December 31 of that year, Assume firther, for the sake of the example, that the before-tax rate of
interest on all investments is 10 percent, that all investments (of both the company and the injured
individual) are subject to income tax, and that the marginal tax rate for all taxpayers is 50 percent.
Thus the after-tax interest rate of return on all investments is 5 percent.
Under the all-events test (as it was applied before the enactment of the 84Act), these facts
would given rise to the following tax-planning opportunity: The parties could agree that, instead
of the $823 cash payment in Year 1, the company would pay the injured party S1OOOfour years
later, at the end of Year 5. Provided that the company was solvent and likely to remain solvent,
the injured party would be indifferent as between these two payment options because they have
the same present value, discounting at the after-tax interest rate. If the parties agree to this
deferred-payment arrangement, the company could then take the fiJll $1000 deduction on its Year
1 tax return.
Assuming the company has income in Year 1 against which to offset the deduction, the
deduction would save the insurer $500 in taxes in that year. The company then combines this
$500 with $323 of its own money and invests the sum at the afier-tax rate of 5% per year. By the
end of Year 5, the money will have grown to $1000 under the current assumptions, the amount
necessary to satisfi the company’s obligation to the injured party, Thus, the out-of-pocket afier-
tax cost to the taxpayer of this liability would be only $323.22
Under the nominal-economic-income treatment of this structured-settlement transaction,
the company would be permitted a deduction of $683 on its Year 1 tax return ($1000 discounted
for four years at the 10 percent before-tax interest rate) and an additional deduction each year
(through Year 5) equal to the annual increase in the present value of the liability resulting from the
passage of time, The discounted present value of the tax saving amounts to $458 in Year 1. Thus,
by investing these tax savings and S365 of its own money in Year 1 (at 5% after tax), the
company could generate the necessary $1000 by the end of Year 5, Thus, one measure of the
tax-deferral effect of this particular structured-settlement agreement is the difference between the
afier-tax cost to the taxpayer under nominal-economic-income taxation ($365) and the afier-tax
cost to the taxpayer under the pre-84 Act all events test ($323)--the difference being $42 in this
example.
The structured-settlement represents an extreme example of the tax deferral available
under the old all events test. To achieve the degree of tax deferral described in the example
above, however, it was necessary for the company not only to be aware of the liability but also to
enter into the structured-settlement contract with the injured party. Such contracts probably
accounted for a relatively small portion of the total amount of risk finding in the pre-84 Act years.
Note, however, that a structured-settlement was not the only means of accelerating deductions
under the pre-84 Act all-events test. In addition, there was a considerable amount of pre-84Act
caselaw that had the effect of allowing accrual-method taxpayers to deduct certain liabilities that
called for the taxpayer to make payouts far into the future,
For example, one court held that the all-events test was satisfied--the liability was fixed--
with respect to a company’s self-insured workers’ compensation liabilities in the year in which the23
injury occurred, provided that those liabilities were uncontested, ” Moreover, courts have
generally held that the length of time between accrual and payment does not affect whether the
deduction could be taken or for how much. As will be discussed below, this result approached
(without quite equaling) the treatment available to insurers under the pre-TRA86 subchapter L.
(The main difference was that an insurer could have deducted the workers’ compensation liability
even if the claims had been contested. )
Thus for workers’ compensation liabilities, to a lesser extent for tort liabilities, and for
other liabilities as well, taxpayers before the TR484 could exploit the old all-events test and defer
taxes by taking deductions years in advance of payments.’*
In 1984 Congress introduced the economic performance requirement, which largely
eliminated the tax-deferral opportunities described above in connection with the old all-events
test.” The economic performance requirement, found in Internal Revenue Code section 461(h),
altered the timing of large classes of deductions under the old all events test. Section 46 l(h)
provides generally that an accrual method taxpayer can deduct an expense no earlier than the
year in which economic performance occurs with respect to that expense, ” With respect to the
“ Crescent Wharf& Warehouse Co, v. Commissioner, 518 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1975), Generally, a taxpayer may
not deduct amounts set aside as a self-insurance reseme for expected future costs. The deduction can be taken ordy
when the all events test is satitiled,
“ Joint Committee (1984),
“ Under IRC section 468B, companies who have tort liabilities can still generate tax benefits by making qualified
payments 10a “designated settlement fund.” However, the companies must comply with set of complicated and
restrictive regulatory requirements, and the size of the m savings of a designated settlement fund are considerably
smaller than the tax savings that were possible under the old all events test.
‘4 The general rules for determining when economicperformancewcurs arestraightforward: Lfthe taxpayer’s
expensearisesout oftheprovisionofservicesto (orby)[hetaxpayer,economicperformanceoccursas the services
are rendered. If theexpensearisesoutofthe provisionofpropertyto(or the useofpropertyby)the taxpayer,
economicperformancewcurs as the property is provided to (or used by) the taxpayer.24
timing of deductions for tort liabilities, workers’ compensation liabilities, and breach-of-contract
liabilities specifically, however, the economic performance requirement essentially placed all
taxpayers on the cash-receipts-and-disbursements method of accounting. Thus for post- 1984 tax
years, liabilities arising out of tort claims, workers’ compensation claims, or contract claims can be
deducted only when payment is actually made by the taxpayer to the party to whom the liability
owed: A tort liability, for example, may be deducted no earlier than the year in which the
taxpayer actually pays the tort award (or settlement amount) to the tort plaintiff..
is
Note that under the economic performance rule, the company in the structured-settlement
example above would been required to delay the $1000 tax deduction until the year of actual
payment--Year 5, In that case (holding all other assumptions the same), the after-tax cost to the
self-insurer of the structured-settlement arrangement would have been $411. This is because the
present value in Year 1 of the delayed tax deduction would be $411, and, as noted above, a total
of $823 is needed in Year 1 to find the $1000 payment in Year 5,
Finally, consider how the manufacturer in the structured-settlement example above could
have firtded its tort liability through a property-casualty insurance company rather than through
self-finding, Make the following assumptions: (a) Just before the occurrence of the injury (at the
end of Year 1), the manufacturer purchased an occurrence-based Commercial General Liability
insurance policy from a property-casualty insurance company, (b) The injury (caused by the
manufacturer’s product) is covered under the policy. (c) The insurer estimates that the covered
injury will give rise to a single $1000 payment to be made four years later, at the end of Year 5.”
“ Perhaps it will take five years for the litigation to run its course; or, in some cases, it make take five years for the
victim to discover the injury25
(d) The premium charged by the insurer is equal to $645, the break-even premium, given statutory
accounting for insurance company income. ” (e)) The insurance premium is deductible as an
ordinary and necessary business expense on the manufacturer’s Year 1tax return. Under these
assumptions, the $645 deduction would save the manufacturer $322 in taxes, Thus the afier-tax
cost to the manufacturer of finding the liability through the property-casualty policy is $323
Under these assumptions, then, the after-tax cost of finding the liability through the property-
casualty insurer and the afier-tax cost of self-finding it (in the event a structured settlement could
be arranged) were the same.
Because of the changes made by the TRA84 (which were made effective for deductions
that would have been allowable afier July 18, 1984 under the prior rules), we would expect the
cost of self-finding certain types of liabilities (especially tort, workers’ compensation, and breach-
of-contract liabilities) to have increased in 1984 and subsequent years. Likewise, the relative cost
of finding such liabilities through property-casualty insurance policies should have decreased
around that time. Therefore, we would expect to see an increase in the quantiy of liability
insurance (especially in the General Liability and Workers’ Compensation lines) that was supplied
and demanded in 1984, 1985, and 1986,
That quantity effect, however, might be de minimis, because of the relatively small
magnitude of the change, That is, it maybe that the discussion above overstates the extent to
which non-insurance-company taxpayers were, pre-TR484, able to accelerate the deduction of
“ In Part IVweexplainhowthe insurancepremiumde~nds upon the tax treatment of the insurance company;
the example applies the pre-TRA86 rules.26
accrued liabilities. Also, the quantity effect may be offset to some extent by the price effects
caused by the changes in the TRA86, which will be discussed below in Part IV.
Part IV. The Effect of Taxes on Break-Even Prices
As mentioned in Part III, one would expect generally that tax rules will influence both the
break-even spot prices of property-casualty insurance (where the treatment of loss reserves is
critical) and the relationship between break-even spot prices and break-even standard premiums
(where the main issue is the treatment of unearned premium reserves). We treat the two pieces
separately, starting with the effect of taxes on break-even spot prices, Note one critical
assumption of this Part and of the article as a whole: We assume throughout that in setting their
reported loss reserves and unearned premium reserves insurers show no systematic bias. That is,
we assume they are not influenced in any direction by the possible effects of these reported
numbers on their tax liabilities, their likelihood of regulatory review, or their financial status in the
capital markets. In fiture work, we hope to isolate the discretionary element in loss-reserving
decisions and to measure the direction and extent of various biasing factors, such as taxes and
regulatory concerns, But for now, an absence of bias is assumed.
Break-Even SDot Prices
Break-Even SDot Prices with No Taxes
By a simple arbitrage argument, the break-even premium on a on a spot policy with
known loss profile is simply the discounted value of the losses. Let r(~ be the yield curve in the
bond market at the time of writing a single-payment policy, understood as the average amual
yield on a zero-coupon bond that pays off t years in the fiture. Then, the break-even condition is27
P(I( )) = ~l(t)e-r(f)fdt
o
This condition expresses the effect of a time-varying discount rate, Note that there is no question
of predicting fiture interest involved. The valuation of the cash flow of losses is based on the
interest rates at the time of writing the policy,
Provided the time shape is fixed, in this simple model, the price of a spot policy at any
given time is determined by the yield cume at that time. The framework permits analysis of the
effects of changes in the yield cume on different standardized time shapes (e.g., Medical
Malpractice, Worker Compensation), as well as variation in the time shape of policies, for
example, alengthening of the payment tail on some line. If the discount rate in the market is the
same, r, for all maturities, the break-even condition is
P(l( )) = ~l(t)e-ndt
0
For the special case of a unit “single-payment” spot policy, that is, a policy that pays off at exactly
one point in time, maturing at T (measured from the time of writing), the break-even premium
(the unit price for that line) is
P(T) = e-rT.
Break-Even SDot Prices with Taxes
In the calculation of the company’s taxable income, gross underwriting income consists of
premiums earned. A deduction is allowed on account of any increase in the liabilities for future
loss payments; that is the loss reserve deduction. We may start by considering the case in which28
taxable income is the same as nominal economic income, as defined above. We then consider
significant deviations in the rules from the nominal economic income standard,
Trees with Nominal Economic Income Accolmting
When we introduce an income tax, we must translate the analysis of cash flows in a single-
payment spot policy to net-of-tax terms, If the income tax were actually based on nominal
economic income, then the insurance company that issued a policy on break-even terms in the
absence of taxes, and filly hedged its position by buying a portfolio of bonds with maturities
matching its payment obligations, would not have any income at any point, and would not pay any
tax. So, under those circumstances, the tax would not affect the equilibrium price of insurance
(except possibly indirectly, through an effect on the level of interest rates). Translated into the
terms of gross income and deductions, the premium, P, would be included as gross income and
the addition to loss reserves of an exactly equal amount (because it is a break-even policy) would
be taken as a deduction. Over time, there would be additional deductions for successive loss
payments, but they would be matched by equal and opposite changes in the level of loss reserves.
In addition, there would be deductions as the value of discounted loss reserves increased by virtue
of the approach to fiture payout points. These deductions would give rise to negative
undenvriting income. They would be matched by the yield on the use of finds up until the time of
payout, which would give rise to positive investment income, offsetting underwriting losses. So
the company’s net taxable income would be zero throughout the life of the contract. (In
Appendix ~ we provide firther discussion of the discount rate appropriate for use in setting loss
resewes, drawing on the analogy between a single-payment spot policy and a discount bond. )29
Taes with Statuto~ Accounting for Loss Reserves
With statutory accounting for loss reserves, the stow is different. The premium comes in
as gross income when received, but the simultaneous deduction is of the undiscoz(nted reseme
The increase in liability on a discounted basis that takes place as the time of future payment
approaches has no tax consequences. As with nominal economic income accounting, loss
payments give rise to a deduction when made, offset by a simultaneous reduction in the deduction
for loss resemes as the stock of undiscounted liabilities for losses incurred is reduced by the
amount paid out. So with statuto~ accounting used for tax purposes, writing what would be a
break-even insurance policy in the absence of taxes results in a stream of changes in tax liabilities
with positive discounted value to the taxpayer.
In working out the details, we need to take account of the fact that the company will
evaluate cash flows on the basis of their after-tax consequences, using the after-tax discount rate,
In the case of a constant tax rate, T,the after-tax discount rate applicable to a cash flow tyears in
the fiture is (1-~r(t).
With statuto~ accounting, there is a deduction for the undiscounted loss reseme at the
time of writing the policy, R(O) = L. The cash flow associated with the policy is thus (1- r~ + rL
at time of issue, followed by the flow, -1(1),at subsequent time, t,consisting of the actual loss
payout, Since the payout is deducted and the corresponding increase in loss reserves is included
in taxable income, there are no tax consequences at payout time. Denoting the break-even
premium under statutory accounting by P , it must satis~ the break-even condition
(1- ~)P’ + rL = ~l(f)e-(l-r)’(’)dt.
o30
Two important characteristics of the impact of taxes using statutory accounting can be
inferred from this break-even condition. First, the tax rate matters. As we show next, the higher
the tax rate, the lower the break-even premium, given the term structure of before-tax interest
rates, Second, the time patter of tax rates matters. For example, other things equal, the lower is
the tax rate anticipated in the fiture, relative to the time of writing the policy, the lower is the
break-even premium. Conversely, an anticipated increase in the rate of tax will result in an
increase in the break-even premium.
We may contrast this break-even condition with the one that would apply under nominal
economic income accounting, which would involve an initial deduction of the discounted value of
the anticipated loss, followed by a stream of deductions for any increase in that discounted value
due to the approach of the payment date, (There is a firther stream of deductions for the
payments themselves that is offset by exactly equal reductions in the stock of reserves.) Letting
~ stand for the discounted value of loss resetves, the cash flow at the time of writing the policy
would be (1- ~P+ Z(O), or
(1 - r)P + r~l(t)e-tidt.
o
Under our assumption that the losses on the policy are known at the outset, the discounted value
of losses remaining to be paid at a time, t‘, subsequent to the date of issue would be given by
F(t) = ~l(t)e ‘r(f-f’)dl The change in discounted reserve is a deduction in calculating nominal
t’
economic income, so would induce a stream of tax savings under a system of nominal economic
income taxation, The rate of cash flow at t‘would then be31
-l(t’)+ rRd(t’) ,
where we have used the fact that, net of payouts, the stock of discounted resemes will grow
instantaneously at the rate of interest. Denoting the break-even premium under nominal economic
income accounting by ~ , it must satisfi the break-even condition
(1 - r)Pe + rRd(0) = ~(l(t’) - rr Rd(l’))e-(l-rJti’dt’.
o
Relying on the discussion in Appendix A we know that this break-even condition implies
Pe = Rd(0) .
The relationship between the two break-even premium levels can be expressed in simple
form in the case of a single-payment policy. The afier-tax cash flow from the break-even
premium under statuto~ accounting must have a discounted (at the afier-tax discount rate) value
of zero:
P’ - r(Ps - 1) - e-( ’-r)rT = O





A somewhat startling implication of the calculation is that the break-even loan proceeds to justi@
a repayment of 1 after a time period T could actually be negative for large enough values of T, r,
or r. The insurer could afford to pay the policyholder to accept coverage, taking its return in the
form of tax savings.
This may be contrasted with the corresponding break-even premium, P , under nominal
economic income accounting for tax purposes,32
P’ =e-rT.










depends upon the tax rate, the discount rate, and the time to maturity (length of the tail for an
insurance policy). If the tax rate is zero or the discount rate is zero, or the time to maturity is
zero, the two amounts are the same. Increasing the tax rate, the discount rate, or the time to
maturity lowers the ratio, that is, lowers the break-even amount under regulatory relative to that
under nominal economic income accounting. For high enough discount rate, tax rate, or time to
maturity, the competitive premium level is negative, whereas the premium is always positive under
nominal economic income accounting
Table 2. Break-Even Premiums, Statutory vs Nominal Economic Income Accounting
RatioofBreak-EvenpremiumsforSin~e.Pa~enL Policy
RegulatoryRelaliveto Nominalfionomic IncomeAccounting
Tax Rale 0.1 0.3 0.5
Interest Raw 0.05 0,1 0.15 0.2 0.05 0.1 0,15 0.2 0,05 0.1 0.15 0.2
Maturity
1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 I.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99
3 1,00 0.99 0.99 0.98 I.00 0.98 0.96 0.93 0.99 0,97 0.94 0.88
10 0.98 0.93 0,79 0.54 0.95 0.76 0.32 -0.36 0.92 0.58 4.25 -1.95
20, 0,93 0.54 4,73 4.41 0.76 4.56 -5.09 -18.66 0.58 -1,95 -11.12 -39.82
Source: Authors’ calculations.
The relationship between the various parmeters (tax rate, discount rate, time to maturity)
and the ratio between break-even premium levels under statutory and financial economic income
accounting is highly nordinear. Table 2 shows that, with a tax rate of 30 percent, the impact33
increases dramatically as the interest rate goes above 10 percent and the time to payoff goes
beyond 10 years. Since the relevant discount rate is the nominal interest rate, it is clear that the
recent history of interest rates in the United States includes periods in which the premiums on
long-tailed lines of insurance might have been significantly affected by tax factors,
Aside on Tax-Exempt Interest
In the analysis thus far we have assumed that the rate at which the company discounts
after-tax cash flows is the afier-tax interest rate, In practice, an important feature of the tax
landscape is the option to hold state and local tax exempt bonds. We propose not to explore in
any depth the maximizing financial portfolio choices by insurance companies. However, to the
extent that tax exempt interest applies at the margin to financial choices by the company, it would
be substituted for the afier-tax interest rate in our analysis. Essentially, the effect is to substitute
for the actual marginal tax rate the, lower, implicit marginal tax rate embodied in the difference
between tax exempt and taxable bond yields. So, for example, if the tax exempt interest rate is 8
percent and the taxable interest rate is 10 percent, the tax rate implicit in the tax exempt yield
would be 20 percent. If the relevant margin for the insurance company is the tax exempt bond,
then the formulas above should employ the implicit marginal tax rate of 20 percent (as applied to
the taxable interest rate), rather than the statutory tax rate.
An insurance company that is well-managed from a tax point of view will, however, try to
assure that the marginal source of finds for the insurance business is fully taxable income. Note
that, whereas the insurance company’s tax rate does not enter the determination of the break-even
premium level under nominal economic income accounting, it does enter under regulato~
accounting. In the latter case, the higher the tax rate, the lower the break-even premium, other34
things equal, It is characteristic of situations in which the yield from an investment according to
taxable income measurement rules incorporates deferral relative to nominal economic income
rules, that the taxpayer with the higher marginal tax rate will be willing to pay the higher price for
a given investment opportunity (Bradford, 1981). In those situations, there will be a tendency for
higher-marginal rate taxpayers to drive exempt or low-rate taxpayers out of activities. In the case
of insurance companies, with regulato~ accounting used for tax purposes, the same tendency is
present. To the extent that an insurance business can be arranged so that the marginal
underwriting loss comes out of filly taxable income, the company will be able to take fill
advantage of the deferral effect of the regulatory accounting. (For a thorough treatment of these
issues, in particular the financial portfolio choices of insurance companies, see Cummins and
Grace, 1994.)
Taes with Statutorily Prescribed Discounted Reserves
As described in Part III, since the T~86, insurance companies have been required to use
discounted reserves in calculating taxable income, As far as spot policies are concerned, it would
be reasonable to describe the post-TRA86 rules as taxing companies roughly on a nominal
economic income basis. As described above, however, the rules limit the flexibility of insurance
companies to vary the loss profile assumed in calculating income, and they incorporate an
assumed interest rate that may be different from the one actually prevailing. To illustrate, suppose
the prescribed profile were “too long,” T’ instead of T for our single-payment example, and the
interest rate “too low,” r‘ instead of r. Then, unlike the case of consistent nominal economic
income accounting, the tax rate and interest rates would influence the break-even premium, P. As35
a consequence, it is necessary to model the determination of break-even premiums using an
explicit specification of the Treasury discount factors.
From Break-Even SDot Prices to Earned Premiums
The theoretical analysis developed above relates to the economics of a spot policy, A
standard policy incorporates a year’s worth of spot policies, paid for at the beginning of the year.
To get from spot policy prices to standard policy prices requires discounting the anticipated spot





also affects the relationship between break-even spot prices and
the treatment of unearned premium resemes (which was changed
Industry data on premiums take the form of amounts earned during the reporting year
The amount earned during a reporting year constitutes the pro rafa portions of premiums on
standard policies that commenced during the previous year or that extend into the next accounting
year. These amounts may be differentially affected by changes in the rates of tax during these
years.
Appendix B describes how we deal with these and many other details in the process of
developing the figures presented in the next part, which describes the empirical results.
Part V. Empirical Results
Profiles, Tax Rates. Discount Rates. ~S Reserve Discount Factors
To implement the formulas derived above we require data on loss profiles, discount rates,
IRS discount factors (for incurred loss resewes) and taxes.36
Profiles
A unit loss profile in a line of insurance s assumed to take the form of a sequence of
discrete payments, ~,, occurring at times, f,, measured from the time of writing. Since this is a unit
profile, the payments sum to 1. The specific profiles we use are based on those promulgated by
the Internal Revenue Service of the U.S. Treasu~ Department in connection with the
development of reseme discount factors. Those profiles are derived by the Treasu~ in a
somewhat ad hoc manner from data on the percentage of incurred losses paid by the end of the
reported accident year and successive years, using the historical record as an approximation to the
forward-looking profiles one would actually like to know.
We distinguish five unit spot policy loss profiles, based on the aggregation of industry data
by the lines of insurance as they were defined by the industry until 1989 (at which point data
began to be reported in somewhat finer detail, and the lines were disaggregated into more
categories). The pre-89 lines are “Auto Liability,” “Other Liability,” “Workers’ Compensation,”
“Medical Malpractice,” and “Farmowners, Homeowners, and Commercial Multiple Peril,
Marine, Aircraft (all perils), and Boiler and Machine~.”
Table 3 presents the Treasu~ profiles as specified in connection with deriving the
Ocean
reserve
discount factors applicable fier 1986. We have extended the profiles to sixteen years, assuming
all losses are paid by the end of the fifteenth year after the accident year.37
Table 3, Unit Loss Profiles Based on Treasury Data







Workers’ and Boiler and
Tax Year Auto Liability Other Liability Compe=tion Medieal Malpractice Mactiery
AY+I) ~ 34,32 9.20 25.92 3,02 55.74
AY+l 30.88 16.19 28.61 9.% 23.39
AY+2 I5.03 14.69 13.33 10.45 7.33
AY+3 8.82 1513 7.74 12.15 4.75
AY+4 4.76 10.99 4.47 9.% 3.05
AY+5 2,73 8.92 350 8.27 2.43
Ay+6 I 1,24 5.11 1.88 7.03 1.05
Ay+T O.a 4.28 I ,73 6.47 0.38
Ay+a 0.23 2.16 1.50 5.13 0.68
Ay+9 0.32 I.02 0,62 2.74 0.32
Ay+lo 0.32 1.02 0.62 2.74 0.32
Ay+ll 0.32 1,02 0.62 2.74 0.32
Ay+12 0.32 1.02 0.62 2.74 0.25
Ay+13 OK 1.02 0,62 2.74 0.00
Ay+14 O.m I.02 0.62 2.74 0.00
Ay+ 15 0.00 7,23 7.58 11.20 0.00
Totals lW.00 Iol),oo lm.oo 10COO 1000o
Source: Derived from Bests’ Averages and Ae~re~ates, 1988. (file:payment.xls)
As discussed in Appendix B, we translate these profiles into assumed spot policies by
treating the first payout as occurring as a discrete amount exactly three months after the time of
writing, and the successive payouts as discrete amounts occurring on the annivers~ dates. So a
typical profile in this application involves a payout at the .25, 1, 2, ,,., etc. -year points. It is
immediately apparent from the table that there is considerable variation in the length of the tails of
the different lines. Based on our assumed timing, the average times to payout implicit in the data
are shown in Table 4. Referring to Table 2, showing the effect of the difference between38
statuto~ and discounted-reserve accounting for tax purposes, we can see that the only line for
which we might look for a significant effect is medical malpractice.














Source: Authors’ calculations on data from Best’s Aggregates and Averages, 1988,
Anticit)ated Tax Rates
Tax rates have changed from time to time, The break-even premium under statutory
accounting depends upon the company’s anticipation of future tax rates. Sometimes tax
legislation specifies the fiture course of tax rates. For purposes of this exercise, we assume that
companies know the tax rate that will, in fact, apply to the year of writing the policy (the first of
two accident years that will be touched by the policy) and for fiture years believe the tax rates
specified in legislation as of the end of the accident year. (We also assume in this paper that
companies do not manipulate their loss reserves. ) Table 5 specifies the tax rates used in our
calculations for each year. The rates shown on the diagonal are the ones that actually applied in
the years in question. The last column, for 1993, is repeated for all fiture years required in the
calculations.39
Table 5, Federal Income Tax Rates
Falaal Lnwme TU Rai= Usul inCalculatingBreak-Evm Premiums @ote: State lax rnk have kcn ignmd.) ,
]TaxRnl- inl I I I I I I I I I
I I 19761 19771 19781 19791 19801
I 1976 .48/ ,48 .48 ‘“.48 “-,48
1977 ,48 .48 .48 48
1978 ~ .48 .46 ,46 .til .+
1979 i .46 46 .Ui ,L .-
1980 .46 .&’ .46 .46
1981 I .46 .46 .46
1982 ~ .46 .46 --- ..v -v ..- --- ..-
&ticipled in 1983 ,46 .46 .46 .4.5 .46 .46 .46
1984 .46 .46 .46 .46 .46 .46 ,.., ..-, ,.-, .
1985 .46 .46 46 .46 .46 .-16i .46 ,46 46
1986 .46 ,4 .34 .34 .341 .34 .34 .34
1987 .4 .34 .34 .34 34 .34 .34
1988 .34 .34 .34 ,34 .34 .34
1989 I .34 .34 .34 .34 .34
Im ,, ,34 ,34 .34 .34
1991 Ii .34 .34 .34
1592 1 I ,34 ,34
1993 I .35




In determining the spot price at any time, discounting is at the then-current term structure
of interest rates. The interest rate data that we use are in the form of yields on Treasu~ securities
of different maturities. Although such a yield is derived as an internal rate of return on securities
that make periodic coupon payments between issue date and maturity, we treat the rates as
applying to zero-coupon bonds with various maturities. So, if the five-year yield is reported as 7
percent, we assume one dollar payable in five years can be bought for e“”’”~=e-j~. The after-tax
interest rate applicable to a 40 percent bracket taxpayer would be 4.2 percent. We use the
notation r(fl to designate the interest rate applicable to a zero of maturity r. Where the relevant
maturity does not correspond exactly to one available in the data (for example, 4 years), we use a
linear interpolation of the rates reported for the nearest adjacent maturities.40
We calculate spot prices for policies written on April 1 and October 1 (more precisely, the
first business day of the 2nd and 4th quarters) each year. The applicable term structures are
derived as a simple average of the term structures, compiled on a daily basis by the Federal
Reserve Board, during the first and second half of the year. Figure 1 shows the term stmcture at
selected dates (the turning points in the 10-year yield in the constructed time series).
Figure 1. Term Structure of Interest Rates, Selected Dates
Average Bond Yields for Various Maturities, Selected Dates




















lyear 2year 3 year 5 year 7 yw 10year 30 year
Maturities
Source: Federal Reserve Board and authors’ calculations.
We use the notation a(r) for the afier tax discount factor applied to a cash flow at time
point tafter the date of issue of a spot policy, These discount factors vary with the date of issue,
in part because the term structure of before-tax interest rates varies and in part because the tax
rates vary. The applicable tax rates for purposes of determining the break-even premium at any41
time are those anticipated at that time, Because the discrete payment profile that we use is an
approximation to a continuous profile, the applicable tax rate is obtained by averaging over the
intewal from zero to the time midway to the next discrete payment point, So, for example, if
T=6, and the tax rate is 46V0 for the first year, and 40% for the next five and a half years, the afier
tax discount factor applicable to a cash flow at the 6-year point is
_rf6)((l-.46) + 5,5(1-.40))6
a(6) =e 6.5
Note that for this model we assume that the relevant tax rates are not the ones that actually
prevailed in all instances, Rather, they are the tax rates that were expected to prevail at the date
for which the afier-tn discount factor is being derived.
Reserve Discount Factors
The resetve discount factors applied to undiscounted loss reserves for income tax
purposes afier 1986 are those promulgated by the U,S. Treasu~ in 1987 and 1992. The factors
provided in 1992 are for the post-1989 definition of lines. For our analysis, we use five of the six
lines for which data are available before 1989. For the post- 1989 period we have aggregated the
more narrowly defined lines into the same five broader lines (auto liability, etc. ). The resewe
discount factors applied in 1992 and thereafter are obtained by averaging the published IRS
factors, using aggregate incurred losses in the disaggregated lines for the year as weights.
Calculated SDot Premiums. 1976-1993
Table 6 to Table 10 show the calculated break-even spot premiums in each line of
insurance from 1976 through 1993 based on our model in Pan IV. The figures shown are simple
averages of the April 1 and October 1 spot policy premiums that we use in the derivation of42
break-even standard and break-even earned premiums. The tables also show the break-even spot
premiums that would have been implied based on statutory accounting (undiscounted 10SS
reserves) and nominal economic income accounting for tax purposes throughout the series of
years. For the years up to 1986, the applicable tax law is based on statuto~ accounting for loss
reserves. After 1986, reserves are discounted for tax purposes. The special fresh start rules
applied in 1986, The column headed “Ratio of P(ATL) to P(NEI)” indicates the irdluence on the
break-even spot premiums of the deviation of the applicable tax law accounting from the nominal
economic income accounting applied to ordinary borrowing and lending, Mer 1986, this ratio
also indicates how closely the Treasury’s rules replicated nominal economic income accounting.
The column headed “Ratio of P(ATL) to P(SA)” indicates the impact of the change in rules in
1986,43
Spot Premiums, Auto Liability Table 6. Break-Even























1.00 1980 0,851 0,84! 0,99 0,84














1986 0.901 0.81 I 0.90 0.88 0.92
1987 0.901 0,901 1,00 0.88 1,02
1988 0.891 0.89] 1,00 0.88 1,01

















Table 7. Break-Even Spot Premiums, Other Liability
Break-Even Spot Premiums, 1976-1993
Other Liability




P under ) Ratio of ~ Statutory ~ Ratio of
Income Applicable Tax P(ATL) to I Accounting ~ P(ATL) to
Year ~ (P(NEI)) , Law (P(ATL)) P(NEI) I (P(SA)) ~ P(SA)
1976 0.761 0,73 o,96i 0.73 1,00
1977 0,76 0.73 0,96 0.73 1.00
1978 I 0,73 0.68 0.93 0.68 1.00
1979 0,70 0,65 0.94 0,65 1,00
1980 I 0.66 0,60 0.91 I 0,60 1,00
1981 0,611 0.53 0.87 0,53 1.00
1982 0.63 0.56 0.89 0,56 , 1,00
1983 0.681 0.62 0,92 0.62 1,00
1984 0.65 0.58 0.90 0.58 1.00
1985 0,69 0.64 0.92 0.64 1.00
1986 0.76 0,55 0.73 0,68 0,81
1987 0.741 0,73 0.99 0,69 1,07
1988 0.73 0.72 1,00 0.70 1,04
1989 0.721 0,72 1,00 0.70 1.04
1990 ~ 0,73 0.73 1,00 0,70! 1.04
1991 ~ 0.76 0.76i 1.00 0.73 1.03
1992 0.79 0,79 1.00 0.77 1.02
1993 0,82 0,81 1.00 0,80 1,02
Source: Authors’ calculations.
.45
Table 8. Break-Even Spot Premiums, Workers’ Compensation















































P under I Ratio of Statuto~ ~ Ratio of
Applicable Tax P(ATL) to ~ Accounting P(ATL) to
Law (P(ATL)) ~ P(NEI) ~ (P(SA)) ~ P(SA)
!
0.81 0.971 0.81 1.00
0,81 I 0.97 0.81 1.00
0.78 0.96 0.78 1,00
0.75 0.96 0.75 1.00
0.721 0.94 0,72, 1,00
0.67~ 0.92 0.67 1.00
0.69 0.93 0,69 1.00
0,74 0.95 0,74 1.00
0,711 0.94 0,71 1.00
0,75 095 0.75 1.00
0,67 0.81 0,78 0,86
0,82 1.00 0,78 1.05
0.81 1.00 0.79 1.02
0,81 1,00 0.79 1.03
0.81 1,00 0,791 1,03
0.83 1,00 0.81~ 1,02
0.86 1.00 0.84 1,02
0.871 1.00 0.86 1,02,
Source: Authors’ calculations.46
Table 9, Break-Even Spot Premiums, Medical Malpractice











P under ~ Ratio of
Applicable Tax P(ATL) to
Law (P(ATL)) P(mI)
1976 I 0.66 0,611 0.92 0.61 1







0,451 1 0.45 i 0,82
1981 i 0,49 0,361 0.73 0,361 1













0,58 1 1988 I 0.62 0.62] 0.99
0.63 0,621 1.00 0,581 1
1990 1 0,63 0.63 I 1,00 0.58i 1






Table 10, Break-Even Spot Premiums, Farmowners, etc.
I Break-Even SDot Premiums. 1976-1993
I Farmowners. Homeowners. Etc.
P under I ~
Nominal : P under
Economic ~ P under I Ratio of ~ Statutory ~ Ratio of
Income Applicable Tax P(ATL) to ; Accounting ‘ P(ATL) to
Year ~ (p~l)) ~Law (P(ATL)) I P(NEI) ~ (P(SA)) I P(SA)
1976 0.93 0.93 1,00 0.93 I 1Oc
1977 0,931 0.93 1,00 0.93 i 1.OC
I 1978 I 0.921 0.91 I 0,991 0.91 I 1.0(
I 1979 1 0.901 0.891 0.991 0.891 1,0(
I 1980 ! 0,89[ 0.881 0,991 0,881 l,OC
1981 I 0.86] 0,851 0,98~ 0,85 1,0(
1982 0.881’ 0.871 0.991 0.87 1 0(
I 1983 ~ 0.901 0.891 0.991 0.891 1 0(
I 1984 ~ 0.891 0.881 0.991 0.881 1.0(
I 1985 I 0.91 I 0.901 0,991 0.901 1.0(
I 1986 I 0.93 i 0.84] 0,91 I 0.911 0.92
I 1987 I 0.921 0.93 I 1,011 0.911 1.02
I 1988 I 0.921 0.921 1.001 0.91 i 1.01
I 1989 I 0.91 I 1,001 0.91 I 1,01
1990 I 0,92 0.92~ 1001 0911 101
1991 0,93 0.931 1.001 0.93 I 1.0(
-.
1 1
I 1992 I 0.951 0,95 I 1.001 0,941 1.OC
I 1993 i 0.95 I 0,95 I 1.001 0.951 l,OC
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Referring to Table 4, we see that the calculated break-even spot premiums have the
expected relationship to the length ‘ofthe tail in a line. In 1978, for example, the break-even
premium under the applicable tax law was .91 in the Farmowners, Homeowners, etc., line (the
line with the shortest tail) and .55 in the Medical Malpractice line (the line with the longest tail).
The differences were more pronounced in the early 1980’s when interest rates were very high by48
historical standards. In 1981, the break-even price in the Farmowners, Homeowners, etc., line
was .85 and ,36 in the Medical Malpractice line.
The difference between break-even prices under statutory accounting and applicable tax
law accounting afier 1986 also corresponds with the expectations based on the average length of
the tails. As expected, the case where the difference is most pronounced is medical malpractice,
where the change from undiscounted to discounted loss reserves accounts for a difference of 13
percent in the break-even price in 1987, declining to a roughly 4 percent difference in 1993. The
impact of the fresh-start rules in 1986 (that gave an extra tax boost to loss reserves established in
1986 and earlier) meant that for that year the tax law change reduced the break-even price below
what it would have been under statutory accounting. The particularly large effect of the tax law
change in 1987 reflects in part the impact of the declining rate of tax from 1986 to 1988. Under
statutory accounting for tax purposes, a declining rate of tax between the receipt of premium and
the policy payout results in a lower break-even premium. The pattern of declines in the impact of
tax reform on break-even premiums after 1987 presumably results from declining interest rates (at
a zero rate of interest the two should be the same), since there were no major changes in the tax
rates after that point,
Comparing the columns of break-even prices under nominal economic income accounting
for tax purposes with the effect of the actual tax law in the period from 1987 onwards (i.e., after
the fresh-start rule had ceased to have any influence), we see that the two are very close. The
ratios are essentially 1 throughout, for all lines, suggesting the Treasury succeeded in
implementing the presumed objective of the 1986 shift to discounted loss reserves49
Calculated Standard Policy Premiums. 1976-1993
In getting to the break-even earned premiums, we calculated break-even standard policy
premiums ineachline ofinsurance for April land October lfrom 1976 through 1993, The
difference between these premiums and the spot premiums presented above is that the standard
policy premiums incorporate the effect of changes in the treatment of unearned premium reserves
(a minor effect) and bring to an earlier time point the effect on premiums of changes in interest
rates and tax rules. Thus, a premium on a policy written on October 1, 1986, incorporates the
effect of tax changes manifested in break-even spot premiums during most of 1987,
Predicted Break-Even Premiums vs. Actual Earned Premiums. Accident Years 1977-1993
Under competitive conditions, the opportunity for profit from all sources, including tax
saving, will tend to be driven to zero. Thus we assume that the tax saving is “passed along” to
the buyer of the policy in the form of a reduced premium. To make the comparison of the
calculated break-even premiums with industry data, we make use of the break-even earned
premium concept discussed above. Table 11 presents these premiums, for accident years 1977
through 1993 (1976 is lost in the derivation of earned premiums), together with the unit earned
premiums implicit in indust~ data for these accident years, interpreted as the inverse of the loss
ratio reported at the end of each accident year, For each line of insurance, there are two columns,
one showing the break-even earned premium (“B-e Earned P“) calculated from our model and
one showing the ratio of earned premiums per dollar of losses incurred (“I/industry loss ratio”)
registered in data for the industry for the year in question, So, for example, our calculated
average of the break-even premiums for the unit standard policies contributing to earned
premiums in the Other Liability line in 1985 was ,61, The ratio of earned premiums to losses50
incurred in that line in that year was .81. The obsemed average “price” was higher than would be
predicted by our calculation.
Table 11, Break-Even Earned Premiums and Observed Loss Ratios, by Line




md Comad Mulnple pc~
Mulnple k~ !ti -
ti - Alra-ao (Au
ha (M Peti ), md
Workm, Medid w), and mlla d
I Auto Lutiry mu LlahlIly Warkad Comwn Mdd M~um mud M*ly
Auto LISIhlIV //mdu8y Iou Olha LIF,tity l/uidm8y 10,, , Common I/mduay 10,, Mdp~a B- l/mdu~ IOJJ M~rj B-, l/mduq 10,,
tie i B+ EarmdP rano B., E-dP r.llo ~ B-, E-d P ,,Yfla , furnd P mno Eared P rut,.
1977 087 1.361 0.70 I 50 0,78 I 30 059 I 19 O.m
1978
170
0.85 1.34 0.66 157 0.75 139 034 098 O.m 1.72
I979 082 I 29 0.62 I 45 0.72 I 41 049 082 0.85
I980
1.52
079 1.26 056 I 20 0,6U I 39 042 068 0,83
1981
I 37
076 1 18 051 I 01 064 I 17 035 060 Ow
1987
I 43
077 I 15 053 0.82 065 I 22 038 0,59 081 121
I983 Om IC9 O 58 068 069 I@ 043 058 084 120
Iw O.w 1.01 057 059 068 093 0.41 Oa 084 1.19
1985 081 1.02 058 0.81 069 o% 0.43 0,83 084 1.25
1986 081 1.12 059 1.57 0.69 1,05 O.a 123 084 l.@
1987 086 1.15 069 I 77 077 I 10 0,57 I 39 0.89
19=
1.73
O.m 1.13 070 161 0.79 108 060 L33 0.89 1.60
1989 0.85 I 10 0.69 144 0.77 106 060 123 0.= 1.31
Im OM Ill 0.70 135 078 107 061 102 0s 136
1991 O,= I 16 0.73 130 O.w 1 12 063 089 O,w 127
1992 Ow I 16 077 I 27 083 1 17 068 om 092 095
1993 091 I 12 Oen I 23 0.86 I 23 071 080 094 125
Source: Authors’ calculations and Bests’ Aggregates andA verages, various years,
In evaluating these figures, one needs to keep in mind that our calculations are highly
stylized, neglecting risk premiums in the discount rates, for example. We would hope to see a
relationship between the calculated and the obsemed prices, not necesstily ‘equality. One
important itiuence on the empirical ratios is the fact that industry data relate to premiums earned
~oss of the cost of acquiring the policies, whereas our calculations would apply to premiums net
of acquisition costs. Best’s repofis the following figures for “other underwriting expenses”
incurred, as a ratio to premiums earned, in the reporting years: 1990 (26.360/0), 1989, (26.250/o),
1988 (25 ,97Yo), 1987 (25,95%), 1986 (26,77Yo). Data disaggregated by line, available for 1990,
are shown in Table 12,51
Table 12. Other Underwriting Expenses, by Line, 1990
























ISource: Bes/’s Aggregates & A verages: Property-Casualty Wition, 1991
To permit more ready comparison of the relationship between calculated and empirical
prices, we present in Figure 2 to Figure 6 plots of normalized break-even prices and
premiums in the data for the five lines. For each line four lines are shown, plotting:
unit earned
the break-
even earned premium (“Break-Even Premium”, our calculated amount), the break-even earned
premium with statutory accounting (“Break-Even Earned Premium, SA”, also calculated, showing
what the break-even premium would have been under continuation of the pre-1986 tax law), the
estimated average unit premium in the industry data (“Inverse Loss Ratio”) and the same average
unit premium deflated by the acquisition cost, represented by the ratios of “other underwriting
expenses” to premiums written in 1990, assumed to hold as a constant throughout (“Y/o of
Inverse Loss Ratio”). The two key lines from the point of view of assessing the predictive power
of the calculated break-even prices on the industry results are the Break-Even Premium and the
“X?! of Inverse Loss Ratio” lines. For the short-tailed lines (auto liability and farmowners-
homeowners), the two lines arguably track reasonably closely, For the longer-tailed lines, for52
which the discount rate is much more important, the industry data display large variation, relative
to the path of the calculated break-even prices, and generally lie above the calculated levels.
Taking the industry 10SSreseme data at face value, they reveal the highly risky nature of the long-
tailed insurance lines. Except for the ve~ longest tailed line, medical malpractice, the variation in
the calculated prices (due, mainly, to variation in interest rates) is very small, relative to the
variation in the industry results.
Finally, the comparison of the two calculated price lines (“Break-Even Premium” and
“Break-Even Earned Premium, SK’) allows an assessment of the importance of changes in the tax
rules as an explanatory factor in the time series of indust~ results, The graphs suggest that the
impact of the changes in the tax law in 1986 was small, relative to the other factors that influence
the average level of industry prices.53
Figure 2. Break-Even Earned Pretium and Inverse Loss Ratio, Auto Liability
Break-Even Esrnd Premiumsand Inverseof hss Mtios, 1977-93
AUIOLiabib&
Time
+ Break-Even Earned Premium
+ Inverse Loss firio
+ 76”/o of Inverse Loss Rstio
+ Brenk-Even Earnd Premiums, SA
Source: Authors’ calculations and Best’s Aggregates and Averages, various years.54
Figure3. Break-Even Earned Pretium and Inverse Loss Ratio, Other Liability
Break-EversEared PremiumsmdInverw of bss Ratios, 1977-93
Other Liabili~
Source: Authors’ calculations and Best’s Aggregates and Averages, various years55
Figure 4. Break-Even Earned Premium and Inverse Loss Ratio, Workers’ Compensation



















* Br4-Even EsunedPremiums SA
Source: Authors’ calculations and Best’s Aggregates and Averages, various years.56
Figure 5. Break-Even Earned Premium and Inverse Loss Ratio, Medical Malpractice
Br~-Even Esrned PremiumssndInverseof LossWtios. 1977-93
Medical hfalpr.sctice
+ Break.Even Esmd Premium
+ [nvm bss Wtio
+ 84% of Inverse Loss fitio
* Br4-Evers Earned Premiums,SA
Time
Source: Authors’ calculations and Best’s Aggregates and Averages, various years.57
Figure 6. Break-Even Earned Premium and Inverse Loss Ratio, Farmowners, Homeowners, Etc.








+ Brti-Even Esmed Prerruum
I
+ Inverse LossRatio
+ 66°A of Inverse Loss RnIio
+ Br&-Evers Earned Premiums,SA
Source: Authors’ calculations and Best’s Agyegates and Averages, various years,
Conclusion
One bottom-line conclusion of our investigation is that the effect of changes in the tax law
is small relative to the other forces that bear on variation in the average price of property-casualty
insurance. The other major conclusion, taken from the tables of break-even spot premiums, is
that the 1986 reforms could account for an increase in the predicted price of insurance ranging
from next-to-nothing for the very short-tailed lines to 5 or 6 percent in the longest tailed line,
medical malpractice, If the 1986 reforms are understood as an excise tax increase on long-tailed58
property-casualty insurance, perhaps the size of the predicted price effect is not a negligible
amount, even if it is not large relative to the annual variation in the industry’s results.
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Appendix A. Loss Resene Discounting with Taxes
In the presence of taxes, the appropriate discount rate for the company to use in
evaluating afier-tax cash flows is the after-tax rate of interest in the market. This is because the
after-tax rate of interest expresses the opportunity available to the company to exchange dollars in
one period for dollars in another. The discount rate applied to the anticipated losses in deriving
the resenes used in calculating nominal economic income is, however, the before-tax interest
rate.
To explain why this is so, consider the analogy to a company’s writing an insurance
policy: floating a zero-coupon bond. The proceeds of the borrowing are analogous to the
premium on the insurance policy. The single payment on the bond at maturity corresponds to the
payoff on a single-payment insurance policy. The analogy of the sale of a policy by an insurance
company with a loan from policyholder to company has been noted by others (see, for example,
Cummins and Grace, 1994).
The analogue to treating the premium as “gross income” of the insurance company would
be treating the proceeds of the borrowing as gross income, There would, however, be an
immediate deduction of the discounted value of the payment anticipated at maturity.
Subsequently, as the time for the company to repay the loan approached, its liability, the
discounted value of its repayment obligatio~ would grow. In the income calculation, this growth
in liability would be allowed as a deduction (it is simply accruing interest). Finally, at maturity,
the company would pay off the loan, taking a deduction for the amount paid, but taking into
income the value of the liability, in equal amount, that it takes off its books at that point.61
Keeping the analogy with the unit single-payment spot policy, let the face value of the
discount bond bel, payable attime Tafierthe date ofissue, time O. Letrbethe rate of interest,
and r the tax rate. Finally, let A be the amount received by the issuing company, The cash flow
of the company at the moment of issuing the bond consists of the proceeds received, A, less the
tax on A, treated as gross income, and plus the tax saving due to the deduction of the discounted
(at r) value of 1, payable T years in the fiture. (Note: In general, in this paper we treat taxes as
though assessed and paid continuously, ) Subsequently the company obtains a deduction for the
growth in value of its repayment obligation under the bond, so there is a stream of tax savings. At
maturity, the company pays 1, and takes a deduction of this amount in the calculation of income
for tax purposes (corresponding to the inclusion as gross income of the premium). This deduction
is, however, balanced by an equal inclusion in income of the elimination of the accrued value of
the liability for payment, corresponding to the write-down of loss reserves in the insurance
context. So there is no tax consequence of payoff at maturity, This three-part after-tax cash
flow, a lump sum received (net of tax), a flow of tax savings, and a lump-sum paid, will be
discounted by the company at the after-tax interest rate. It remains to show that the break-even
value of A, is simply the payoff, 1, discounted to time Oat the before-fux rate of interest.
The break-even condition is that the stream of net afier-tax cash flows have a discounted
(at the ufter-fm rate of interest) value of zero:
T
(1 - r)A + W-”T + r~r(e -(T- f)r)e-(l-r)rl~l _ e-(l-x)rT = o
0
This simplifies to
(1- r)A + Z-’T +rre-”T\emdf -e-~l-r)’T =O
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We can explicitly integrate to get
trT
(1- r) A+m-rT +zre-rT(e ~- l)_e-f~-’j’T =0,
This, in turn, simplifies to
(1- r) A-(1- r)e-rT = O,
or
A =e-rT,
Mer a bit of work, we get the expected answer: Under nominal economic income taxation, the
value of a discount bond, taking into account tax effects, is obtained by discounting the cash flow,
exclusive of taxes, at the before-tax interest rate.
Appendix B. Details of the Calculations
In this appendix we add details to the description in the body of the paper of the
calculation of premiums for empirical implemental ion.
Calculating Break-Even Spot Prices
~g
Under nominal income accounting, the tax rate does not enter the determination of break-
even spot prices. The break-even spot premium is simply the discounted value of the loss
payments, using the before-tax discount rate, So the break-even spot premium for a general




Break-Even Spot Prices under Statutow Accounting for Tax purposes (Dre-TRA86)
The break-even spot premium for a single-payment spot policy, with maturity, Z in the
pre-1986 tax regime is given by
(1- r) P(7’)+ r(0) = e-(’-’)r(r)r
provided there is no anticipated change in the tax rate, If a change in tax rate is anticipated, the
exponent in the discount factor on the right-hand side is modified, as discussed in the body of the
paper.
The break-even spot premium for a general policy with loss profile specified by the
sequence, ~,, (to simplifi, again assuming no change in the applicable tax rate) is given by
(1- r) P({lJ}) + r = ~l,e-(’-r)’(”)”
J
Break-Even Sr)ot Prices with Discounted Loss Reserves (Dost-TR486)
For policies written after December 31, 1986, prescribed reserve discount factors are
applied to loss reserves at year end, the factors depending upon the line of insurance, As we have
done in the analysis of break-even prices with statutory accounting, we assume that tax liabilities
are calculated continuously, so that the gross premium income and initial loss reserve deductions
are effectively realized immediately upon writing a new spot policy, In the case of discounted loss
resemes, there is a sequence of additions that result from the passing of time.
To illustrate the way the discount factors enter the break-even conditions, let the reserve
discount factors applied at the moment of writing, on the first anniversary, and so on, be denoted
fi,~l, A, etc. For a single-payment spot policy, the factors are increasing, as the undiscounted loss
reserve remains constant until the moment of payment. The discount factors thus reflect the
approach in time of the single payment, For a more general policy, the discount factors may64
decrease, as the effective length of the remaining tail of payments may increase as the early
payments are realized. In the case of a unit single-payment spot policy with maturity, T (taken to
be an integer), assuming a constant tax rate, the break-even condition is
(1- r) P(T)+ r f. +r(f, - fo)e -(1-r )r(l) + ~ (f2 _ f,)e-(1-r)r(2)2 +.+.+.
+7 ~f~-1 – f~-z~e
_(l-r )r(~-l)(~-l) + ~(l - fT_, je -(1-r )r(T)T = e-(l-r)r(T)T
On the left hand side are included the tax savings due to the successive additions to loss reserves
owing to the passing of time. The last term on the lefi is the tax
the last value of the discounted reserve from unity. On the right
payment.
saving due to any divergence of
hand side is the discounted loss
If the tax rate is varying over time, the value of the deductions and the after-tax discount
factors
below.
will be affected in the manner discussed in general terms above and spelled out in detail
Using Line-Specl~c Reserve Discount Factors
If we were provided with the appropriate discount factors for each possible single-
payment policy, we could calculate the break-even premium for a general spot policy, with loss
profile specified by a sequence of loss payments, by treating each separate payment as a single-
payment spot policy and using the formula above. Then add the premiums together,
For our purposes, there are two problems with the discount factors provided by the
Internal Revenue Service (~S). First, they are designed to apply to an aggregation of policies
over a one-year period, rather than spot policies. Second, they apply to a given line, rather than
to single-payment spot policies.
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The first reserve discount factor specified by the IRS is to be applied to the reserve in the
relevant line on the company’s books at the end of the initial accident-year Conceived of in terms
of an aggregate of spot policies, this reserve includes amounts remaining to be paid on policies
ranging in age from one year (written on January 1) to zero years (written on December 31). The
IRS reserve discount factor is based on a spot policy written on July 1. It is thus “too close” to
the loss payout (i.e., too high) compared to the factor appropriate for the actual payout pattern
associated with a newly-written spot policy. Compared with the policy written a year earlier, the
IRS factor is six months “too far” from the actual payouts (so, too low). As an approximation,
we apply this factor to the undiscounted loss reseme (equal to 1 for a unit policy) associated with
a newly written spot policy, That is, we allow an immediate deduction of this first factor at the
time of writing a unit spot policy.
The development of the fitiher reserve deductions, associated with the gradual increase in
the reserve discount factor as the payout time approaches, is complicated by the fact that the IRS
reserve discount factors are specified by line of insurance, rather than by timing of single
payments. As will be discussed, because of the way cumulative loss data are reported, we
approximate the loss profile in a given line as involving discrete loss payments at the three-month
point from the date of writing a spot policy, followed by payouts on the annivers~ dates. In our
treatment of the payout profi!es as known with certainty, an equal reduction in the (undiscounted)
unpaid loss reserve corresponds to each loss payout.
The taxable income calculation brings info income the decljne in discounted resemes
during the year, and allows a deductjon of the loss payments during the year, Using the notation,
L(fl, for the cumulative payments up to and including t,the path of undiscounted reserves for a66
unit policy is given by 1, (1- L(l)), (l - L(2)), etc., at the outset and at successive anniversaries.
The path of discounted reserves, is thus given by~o,JI(l - L(l)), j2(l - L(2)), etc. The taxable
income associated with a unit policy is thus P-jo at the moment of writing, ~o-.l(l - L(l)) -L(l) in
the first year, ~1(1-L(l)) -.2(1- L@))-&@)- L(l)) in the second year, and so on. In the last year, the
taxable income will bej~.l(l -L(T- 1))-(1- L(T- 1)),
The IRS cumulative loss profiles specify amounts regarded as paid as of 6 months from
the time or writing the policy in a line, 1,5 years, etc., through an assumed “last year, ” Let the
cumulative amount paid out at these successive points be denoted Fo, FI, etc., through Fr. For a
unit policy, the last one is 1. We think of these cumulative payouts as derived from constant
payout rules over the interval in question. So the rare of loss payout would start at 2*F0 for the
first six months of the policy life (the factor of 2 comes from the fact that the interval to the first
cumulation point is just half a year). The loss payout would continue at the rate of FI-FO for the
period horn .5 years to 1,5 years, at the rate of FZ-FJ for the period from 1.5 years to 2,5 years,
etc.
The constant rates are in turn converted to discrete payments at the midpoints of the
various intervals. So the first loss payout is taken to be FO at the .25-year (3-month) point, The
second payout is FI-FO at the midpoint between .5 years and 1.5 year, that is, at the 1-year point
And so on. The last payout is FrFr.l=l - Fr.l at the T-year point.
The formulas above assume constant tax rates, In the calculations, as summarized in
Table 13, the afier tax discount factors, a(f), are based on the actual anticipated tax rates, which
are also used to detetine the projected tax consequences of fiture cash flows.67
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Break-Even Spot Prices ~ost-TRA86: The Transition
These descriptions apply to spot policies written in worlds governed entirely by either the
pre- or post-TW86 rules. It remains to detetine the break-even price for a policy that crossed
the boundary, Consider, for example, a single-payment spot policy written on April 1, 1986. An
immediate deduction of the undiscounted loss reseme would apply at the moment of writing.
Then, as of Janu~ 1, 1986, it would begin to accrue additional deductions for the accruing value
of its discounted reserve as of that date. These deductions would continue until the maturity date,
at which point, ideally, the discounted reseme would equal the payoff amount. The tu effect of
the loss deduction would, as usual, be offset by the write-down of the reserve associated with the
policy.68
The fresh start rule meant that, in effect, companies received tax deductions of more than
100 percent of the amount of the losses. For policies that had already been written, this meant a
gain to the companies, but had no incentive effect, no effect on the break-even prices, But to the
extent a company could anticipate the fresh start rule, there would be a downward effect on the
break-even price,
For purposes of this exercise, we assume that the fresh start rules were built into break-
even premiums starting January 1, 1986. As will be discussed below, in application, we calculate
spot prices as of the first day of the second and fourth quarters each year. So the fresh stafi rules
need to be taken into account for the two prices calculated for 1986.
For the single-payment spot policy with maturity, T, written on April 1, 1986, the fresh
start rule meant an immediate deduction of 1, and then a stream of deductions, which we treat as
occurring on the anniversa~ dates, along the lines just discussed for the policy entirely in the
post-TW86 regime. For the case of a constant tax rate, the break-even condition is then
(1- r) P(T)+ r + r (fl - fO)e-(l-r “(~) + r (J2 - fl)e-(’-r “C2)2+,+.+.
‘r (f[T] ‘f[T]-l)e
_(I-r )r([T])[T] + ~ (1 – f[T])e -(1-r )r(T)T = e-(l-r )r(T)T
The difference from the previous formula is that the first resewe deduction is worth r, instead of
q,.
Under
Summin~ UD the Cases
In all we calculate break-even spot prices under three sets of assumptions about taxes:
statutory accounting, the unit loss is deducted at the moment of writing the policy. In
terns of Table 13, the effect is to setj=l for all i. Under applicable tax law, the same is true until
1986. From 1987 onward, the discount factors, j , prescribed by the Internal Revenue service69
apply. For 1986, the same discount factors apply for cash flows in 1987 and later, but taxable
income ~nthe 1986 of wrifing the policy (but not on the anniversa~) is based on~o=l. Under
nominal economic income the price is based on the cash flow of premium and payments only,
without regard to taxes, using the discount factors based on beJore la interest rates.
Calculating Standard Policy Premiums
Accounting for the Time Structure of an Insurance Policy
In order to calculate break-even premiums to compare with data we need to take account
of the fact that the usual insurance policy covers events that occur during a specified period,
usually a year, commencing with the date of issue. The premium is generally payable at the
beginning of the policy year. At the moment of writing, there will have been no losses incurred,
and so no addition to the loss reserve. As time passes, losses accumulate, and the company books
incurred losses, basing its accounts on actual information (for example, claims actually filed) and
experience with similar insurance polices in the past, At the moment of writing the policy the
company does acquire an asset, the premium paid or receivable, to which corresponds the liability
to provide coverage for the period covered. At the moment of writing, the coverage for which
the premium is payment has yet to be delivered, so the liability to provide that coverage is carried
on the books as an “unearned” premium reserve. By convention, the premium on a policy is
treated as “earned” ratably over the policy period.
The significance of these accounting details is, in part, the necessity they reveal of dealing
with the distinction between premiums written, which are taken into income for both tax and
regulatory purposes, and the set-aside for premiums not yet earned, which is allowed for in tax
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and regulatory accounting. The tax rules with respect to unearned premium resewes were
changed in the reform act of 1986, and we need to incorporate this change to our calculations.
A second reason for undertaking an explicit analysis of the timing of premiums received
and earned is that the premium determined in our calculations will actually be earned over a
period of time which will generally include more than one taxable year. Since tax rules generally
apply to whole calendar years, the price of a policy that will span January 1 will need to
incorporate the changing rules on the income as well as the deduction (loss reserves) side,
A third reason is that indust~ data we examine relate to premiums earned, reported by
accident year. Those premiums earned will be in part the playing out of policy years that began
the year before the accident year in question and in part the initial phase of policies written during
the accident year. If premiums were separately calculated and reported for coverage within a
particular calendar year (so that a typical one-year policy, written on September 1, 1987, would
have a premium for the period though December31, 1987, and a premium for the period,
January 1, 1988 through August 31, 1988), this would not create problems for us. But the
convention that premiums are earned ratably over the policy period means that data on earned
premiums may show a different pattern than year by year calculations would imply.
To illustrate, suppose that the theory tells us that in some isolated year, say 1983, the tax
rules imply a very high spot premium, relative to all other years. A company writing a one-year
policy on September 1, 1982, could be thought of as writing two policies, a low-priced one for
the last four months of 1982, and a high-priced one for January-August 1983. There will be just
one price, however, intermediate between the two, which will be reported (and taxed) partly in
1982 and partly in 1983. Premiums earned for accident year 1982 will thus include some of the71
effect of the 1983 tax rule changes (and thus be higher than would be predicted, based just on
1982 tax rules), while the premiums earned in the 1983 accident year will include a residual
influence of the pre-1983 rules.
The analysis thus far of break-even spot premiums assumed that, at a given moment, the
insurance company acquires a liability to make a known sequence of loss payments over time, and
inquired into the up-front payment that would make this a break-even proposition, taking into
account the tax implied tax payments. The fact that, in actuality, the company typically sells a
whole year’s worth of spot policies at once influences the way we need to interpret data on loss
reserves and earned premiums and, because of the details of the treatment of the premium
payment under the tax law, it affects the break-even formulas as well,
For example, when an insurance company sells a medical malpractice policy for a term of
one year, commencing on September 1, 1988, it knows that on September 1, with certain
probabilities, an event will occur that will give rise to a claim, and that the result will be a certain
series of loss payments and expenses in the fiture, It knows the same for September 2, and so on.
The premium it charges for this one-year policy is to pay for these 365 one-day policies. For
present purposes, we continue to dispense entirely with the risk aspect of this situation, and we
imagine the company as taking on 365 known liabilities. Thus, one of the liabilities, incorporated
in the premium as of September 1, is to provide a stream of payments, starting December 6, with
the characteristic medical malpractice profile.
In the absence of taxes, this nicety would not matter much, The one-year premium would
simply be the discounted value of the 365 spot premiums on the daily policies. With taxes, the
nicety could matter, because the spot prices may themselves va~ over the year as the result of72
variation in the interest rates or in the tax rules themselves. But the tax system, in effect, treats
the spot price as uniform throughout the policy year. (The single amual premium is treated as
“earned” in propofiion to the fraction of the policy year that has elapsed. )
To explore this issue, consider the case of a loss payment profile on the spot policy
whereby the first loss payment occurs ,5 years afier the covered day, Mer that, payments occur
at one-year intervals. The loss reserve is set up on the date the policy is written. The new
question to be considered is how tax law changes as of January 1 affect the analysis.
For a policy written after July 1, the loss payments are shified by one year, in terms of the
applicable tax law, compared with the policy written before July 1. So if interest rates are
unchanged, for the case of spot premiums (implying no unearned premium problem), there will be
one premium pre-July 1 and another one post-July 1. In going from the second half of one year to
the first half of the next, there may be a difference in spot premium (even given constant interest
rates), owing to the taxation of the premium, net of loss reseme. This is why we calculate two
spot prices for each year, using the interest rate conditions as of the beginning of April and
October.
Calculating Break-Even Standard Policy Prices
The break-even premium on a standard policy is the amount the company must receive to
finance the flow of premiums on the embedded implicit spot policies over the year. So the
starting point for calculating it is the calculation of spot premiums.
We assume that, looking forward from April 1, the company correctly anticipates the spot
premiums that will prevail on October 1 of the current year and on April 1 of the next year. Our
calculated break-even standard premium on April 1 is based on the approximation of a single spot73
policy issued on July of the current year and January 1 of the next year, The JUly 1 spot
premium is the average of the spot premiums on April 1 and October 1. The January 1 spot
premium is the average of the October 1 spot premium and next year’s April 1 spot premium.
These hypothetical spot premiums (July 1 and January 1) are discounted to April 1.
The analogous procedure is used to derive the October 1 standard premium each year.
The detail to be resolved is the discount rate to apply to these spot premiums in getting to
the standard premiums.
Stan&rd Policy Prices with No Trees
In the absence of taxes, the break-even premium on a standard
particular time, would simply be the discounted (at the before-tax rate
policy starting at a
of interest) value of the
flow of spot premiums over the year. In the case in which the unit spot premium is, P, and taxes




Typical values of the multiplicative factor are ,975, .952, and ,906, for r = .05, ,10, and .20,
respectively,
Stan&rd Poiicy Prices pre-TM86
Taxes complicate the story. Consider the question: what payment must the company
receive on October 1, 1983, to deliver a commitment to provide a unit spot policy on September
30, 1984 (i.e., the last day of the policy year)? In the pre-TRA86 regime, the October 1, 1983
payment, regarded as gross income, would have been offset by an addition to the unearned
premium resewe, so there would be no tax consequences at that point. On September 30, 1984,74
the unearned premium reseme would have been debited by the amount of the unearned premium
reserve, resulting in an inclusion in taxable income. So if x is the October 1, 1983, payment, and y
is the September 30, 1984, spot premium then the after-tax cash flows that need to be equated in
value are summarized in Table 14.
Table 14, Discounting from Spot to Standard Premium
After-Tax
Cash Flows October 1, 1983 September 30, 1984
Up Front x -<9/30/84) “X
spot y- <9/30/84) *Y
Carrying out the calculation for equating the values of the two cash flows, using the after-tax
discount rate, yields (assuming constant tax rate):
or
The implicit discount from spot to the element of the standard premium that buys the last bit of
spot coverage in the policy year is found by taking the negative of the natural log of the right hand
side. For example, for r = 10 percent and T= 40 percent, the implicit discount rate is 9.8 percent.
The example suggests that for the pre-TRA86 rules, one could safely derive standard
premium prices from spot prices by discounting at the before-tax rate of return. We adopt this
approximation.
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Stan&rd Policy Prices afler December 31, 1986
In the post-TRA86 regime, the company would be allowed a deduction from the October
1, 1988 payment of only 80 percent of the addition to unearned premium reserve account, so
there would be taxable income at that point, On September 30, 1989, the reduction of the
unearned premium reserve account by the amount of the spot premium would give rise to an
inclusion in taxable income of 80 percent of that amount. So if x is the October 1, 1988, payment,
and y is the September 30, 1989, spot premium, then the after-tax cash flows that need to be
equated in value are as shown in Table 15.
Table 15, Discounting horn Spot to Standard, post-1986
After-Tax
Cash Flows October 1, 1988 September 30, 1989
Up Front x-r(lo/l/88)*,2x -~9/30/89) *.8x
spot y-~9/30/89))*y
Using subscripts to indicate the timing of the tax rates, the value of x is given by
x(l–.2~1–.8rz e-(1-t2)’) = Y(I _ ~z)e-(1-r2)r ,
x (1- ~,)e-(’-”)r —=
Y l–.2~, -.8T2 e-(l-rz)~
As Table 16 shows, the effect of the TR486 change was to reduce slightly the implicit
discount rate applicable to the end-of-year spot premium in determining the beginning-of-year
standard premium (i.e., raise the break-even standard premium). The effect was enhanced by the
pattern of tax rate changes in effect in 1987 and 1988. (For calendar year taxpayers, the rate was
40 percent in 1987 and 34 percent in 1988.) As a simplification, we ignored the effect of the76
changed treatment oft he unearned premium reserve except for 1987, when we based the
discounting on one half of the market rate.
Table 16, Implicit Discount from Year-End
Spot to Beginning of Year Standard Premium
I Imulicit Discount from End-of-Year Suet





tau 1 tau2 [ r rhat ~ discount
34% 34% I 5% I 4.6VOI 0.93
I 340/o I 34% I 10VO I 9.2%1 0,92
I 34% I 34% I 20% I 18.2%1 0,91
I 46% I 40% I 5% I 2.6%1 0.52
] 46% ] 40% ] 10% I 7,1%] 0,71
46°A 40% I 20% 16,0701 0.80
40’?/0 34% 5% 2,870i 0.56
I 40% 1 34% I 1070 i 7.4YOI 0.74
I 40% I 34% I 20V0 I 16.4% 0,82
Source: Authors’ calculations.
The Transition from Pre- to Post-TW86 Rules
Just as special transition rules were enacted in comection with the change in the treatment
of unpaid losses effected by the ~86, special rules also applied to the change in the treatment
of the unearned premium reseme, As has just been discussed, according to the TRA86, ody 80
percent of the end-of-year stock of unearned premiums is allowed as a deduction The effect is to
exclude 20 percent of the beginning of year stock from taxable income, Applied at the transition,
January 1, 1987, the new rule would have implied forgiveness of tax on 20 percent of the then-77
outstanding stock of unearned premiums. Under special transition rules, that 20 percent was
brought into income over a six year period, 1/6 each year,
Looking ahead from 1986, the transition treatment of unearned premiums for that year
was actually more favorable than the pre-existing regime, since the return of unearned premiums
to taxable income was slightly deferred, and the tax rates at which the deferred premiums were
included was lower than that at which they had been deducted, We decided to neglect this
transitional effect in our calculations.
Modeling the Annual Statement Data on Earned Premiums
One more step is needed in getting to a break-even premium figure that can be compared
to company or industry data on premiums earned during a particular year, Let P(fl, temporarily,
stand for the total of standard policy premiums written (by a company or for the industry) at time
[, representing prepayment of coverage over the next year, where the current year begins at time
0, P(t) will give rise to a quantum (1-t)P(~ of premiums earned in the current year and tP(~ in
the neti year. With a constant flow of new policies, an average of 1/4 of the new premiums
written in the first half of the year will show up the next year, An average of 3/4 of the new
premiums written in the second half of the year will show up the next year. If the premiums
written in the successive halves of calendar years are Pl, P2, P3, P4, the premiums reported as
earned in year 2 will be
PI +3P2 +3P3 +P4
4
This is motivation for what we term the break-even earned premium, The break-even
premium earned premium is a weighted average of unit stan~rd premiums. It corresponds to the
level of premiums earned during an accident year in the case of a company writing policies at a78
constant rate, Reinterpret PI, P2, Pj, Pf as the unit standard premiums in the respective half years
(rather than totals of premiums written), thought of as centered in each half year (April 1 and
October 1). The normalized break-even earned premium in year 2 is then
PI +3P2 +3P3 + P4
8
This is the formula used in calculating the break-even earned premiums.